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Abstract
Introduction: Terrorist use of a radiological dispersal device (RDD, or ‘‘dirty bomb’’), which combines a conventional
explosive device with radiological materials, is among the National Planning Scenarios of the United States government.
Understanding employee willingness to respond is critical for planning experts. Previous research has demonstrated that
perception of threat and efficacy is key in the assessing willingness to respond to a RDD event.
Methods: An anonymous online survey was used to evaluate the willingness of hospital employees to respond to a RDD
event. Agreement with a series of belief statements was assessed, following a methodology validated in previous work. The
survey was available online to all 18,612 employees of the Johns Hopkins Hospital from January to March 2009.
Results: Surveys were completed by 3426 employees (18.4%), whose demographic distribution was similar to overall
hospital staff. 39% of hospital workers were not willing to respond to a RDD scenario if asked but not required to do so. Only
11% more were willing if required. Workers who were hesitant to agree to work additional hours when required were 20
times less likely to report during a RDD emergency. Respondents who perceived their peers as likely to report to work in a
RDD emergency were 17 times more likely to respond during a RDD event if asked. Only 27.9% of the hospital employees
with a perception of low efficacy declared willingness to respond to a severe RDD event. Perception of threat had little
impact on willingness to respond among hospital workers.
Conclusions: Radiological scenarios such as RDDs are among the most dreaded emergency events yet studied. Several
attitudinal indicators can help to identify hospital employees unlikely to respond. These risk-perception modifiers must then
be addressed through training to enable effective hospital response to a RDD event.
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Introduction
The number of terrorist bombings in the world has risen in the
last 10 years [1,2]. Examples such as the bombings in Bali (2002,
2005), Istanbul (2003), Madrid (2004), Egypt (2005), London
(2005), and Mumbai (2006, 2009) have demonstrated the need for
effective and rapid response in order to minimize casualties. A
radiological dispersal device (RDD, or ‘‘dirty bomb’’) combines a
conventional explosive device with radiological materials. This
type of device has the potential to generate greater effects on the
targeted population than a conventional explosive device - due not
only to radiological injury, but perhaps more importantly due to
the profound economic and psychological impact of such an attack
[3–5]. Although yet to be deployed successfully, the potential use
of a RDD as a terrorist weapon is of significant concern to the
United States government; deployment of a RDD is one of the
fifteen Department of Homeland Security National Planning
Scenarios [6]. Response to a dirty bomb detonation was exercised
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RDD in Seattle was one of the simultaneous modes of attacks used
by hypothetical international terrorists [7].
In addition to psychological trauma to affected populations,
RDD events may result in physical injuries and variable levels of
radiation contamination. Severity of physical injuries depends on
the nature of the explosive used, and extent of contamination is
based on the degree of dispersal of the associated radiation. The
physical health consequences from the RDD blast and its
dispersed radiation would likely be limited to a maximum area
of a few city blocks; further, the most significant contributor to
injury and mortality from a RDD would be from the blast rather
than the radiation [8]. Indeed, any victim close enough to receive
an acute lethal radiation dose would likely have been killed by the
blast itself [9]. For most people directly involved in a RDD
scenario, it has been estimated that the exposure would carry a
lifetime health risk comparable to that from smoking five packages
of cigarettes or the accident risk of taking a hike [10]. Thus, from a
public health perspective, a RDD is much more of a psychological
weapon than a physical one [11].
Experts agree that while a dirty bomb is unlikely to sicken or kill
many people from a public health perspective, it is very likely to
cause fear and panic in the general population [12,13] and is likely
to result in disaster activation at local hospitals. The potential
panic engendered by such an attack may overwhelm local health
care facilities with individuals experiencing psychological rather
than physical effects from the hazard itself [14]. The Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) estimates that 50–80% of
victims of an explosive event arrive at medical facilities within the
first 90 minutes [15] which illustrates the importance of hospitals
being prepared to rely on their own staff for an initial rapid
response to a radiological event, rather than relying heavily on
external response assets. A growing body of emergency prepared-
ness literature among a variety of care providers—including
emergency medical technicians (EMTs) [16], local public health
department workers [17,18], and urban healthcare workers [19–
22] —indicates that willingness to respond during a disaster is a
scenario-specific phenomenon. Furthermore, research suggests
that response willingness is multidimensional and influenced by a
variety of risk perception modifiers peripheral to the actual event,
such as perception of the importance of one’s role in the agency’s
overall response [23] and concerns about personal and family
safety [10]. Personal safety concerns may play an even larger role
for health care responders in the dirty bomb scenario than in
many other types of disaster scenarios, given factors such as the
risk of exposure to the radiological contaminant, potential lack of
adequate protective equipment, and the unusual nature of this
type of attack [23–25].
The willingness of hospital-wide staff to respond to a RDD has
not yet been assessed. One framework that has proved applicable
in assessing root causes of willingness to respond to duty during
emergencies has been Witte’s Extended Parallel Process Model
(EPPM). This framework allows for examining the interplay and
influence of perceptions of ‘‘threat’’ and ‘‘efficacy’’ on adaptive or
maladaptive behavior of healthcare workers in deciding whether
to report to duty in the face of risk [26].
We have set out to assess the willingness of employees at a large,
urban, tertiary-care medical center to respond during a RDD
event. Accordingly, we aim to gauge whether a clinically
significant proportion of the workforce may be unwilling to
respond to duty during an RDD event, and whether specific
personal characteristics and beliefs are independently associated
with willingness to respond in this event. We further analyze the
influences of perceived threat and perceived efficacy among
hospital employees utilizing Witte’s EPPM and attempt to identify
factors potentially influencing willingness and ability to respond.
Methods
Study Setting
The survey was administered at the Johns Hopkins Hospital
(JHH) in metropolitan Baltimore, Maryland. JHH is a Level 1
Trauma Center with 982 beds. It is the major teaching center for
the Johns Hopkins School of Medicine and School of Nursing.
Ethics Statement
Research ethics approval for the survey and its administration
was received from The Johns Hopkins Medicine Institutional
Review Board (JHM IRB) with a waiver of written consent. Study
materials included an electronic disclosure describing the study
and emphasizing voluntary participation; verbal consent was not
requested or required by JHM IRB.
Study tool
The survey tool, entitled ‘‘Disaster Preparedness and Emergen-
cy Response Survey’’, was an anonymous online instrument
(SurveyMonkey.com, Portland, OR) consisting of two main
sections: a demographic section and an attitude/belief section
that focused on hospital workers’ attitudes and beliefs toward
emergency response. The demographic and professional informa-
tion included are listed in Table S1.
For the RDD scenario, a series of attitude and belief statements
were presented for level of agreement along with two open-ended
questions. Responses to the attitude and belief statements were
based on a 9-point Likert scale with a response of ‘1’ indicating
strong agreement with the statement, a response of ‘5’ indicating
neutrality, and a response of ‘9’ indicating strong disagreement
with the statement. Respondents could also indicate ‘‘don’t know’’.
These attitudes and beliefs are detailed in the Results section. Two
main contexts for willingness to respond (‘‘WTR’’) to a RDD were
also assessed - WTR if asked but not required to respond (hereafter
referred to as ‘‘WTR if asked’’), and WTR if required, were
presented using the 9-point Likert scale.
In accordance with the EPPM-based threat and efficacy
methodology validated by multiple studies and explained in
previous work [17,18,27,28], levels of perceived threat and
perceived efficacy (both with regards to the individual respondent)
were determined, and four profiles were constructed.
Study participants
All employees of the Johns Hopkins Hospital (N=18,612) were
designated as eligible for participation in the survey, which was
conducted from January 2, 2009 to March 9, 2009. Study
notification and requests for voluntary participation were
distributed via department manager announcements, hospital-
wide emails, posters, and informational plasma screens throughout
the hospital.
Statistical Analysis
Prior to analysis, responses to the attitude and belief statements
were dichotomized into categories of #4 (‘positive response’)
versus $5 (‘negative response’). One of the four EPPM profiles
was assigned to each respondent using the low and high perceived
threat and efficacy categories calculated as described in previous
EPPM survey-based research [17,18,27,28].
Distributions of demographic/professional factors and agree-
ment with attitude/belief statements were obtained with respect to
the two main WTR contexts noted above. Univariate logistic
Hospital Workers Response to Radiological Event
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factors most predictive of a positive response to the main WTR
contexts. Multivariate logistic regression analyses, adjusting for the
key demographic factors, were then performed to evaluate the
attitude/belief statements, EPPM profiles, and training scenarios
predictive of a positive response for each of the main WTR
contexts. Missing and ‘‘don’t know’’ responses were excluded from
the analyses. All analyses were performed using STATA version
11.1 (STATA Corporation, 2010; College Station, TX).
Results
Responses to the online survey were received from 3426 JHH
employees. This sample constitutes 18.4% of JHH staff. An
accurate estimate for response rate is difficult to assess, as it was
not possible to ascertain what proportion of JHH staff have indeed
been exposed to the email invitation to participate in the survey.
Key characteristics of the respondents are detailed in Table S1;
JHH staff data on age, gender and professional category show that
this sample is representative of the overall JHH staff character-
istics.
Among the respondents, 27.3% were male, and 72.7% were
female; 16.5% were younger than 30 years, 47.5% were aged 30–
49 years, and 36% were aged 50 and older. Thirty-four percent of
the respondents were clinical staff, and 66% were non-clinical (the
latter including food service/linens, IT, legal, executive officers,
nursing administration, parking, pharmacy, safety, social workers,
supply chain, telecommunications, etc). Of the 1170 clinical
respondents, 42.7% were physicians, 49.2% were nurses, and
8.1% were ‘‘other’’ (physician extenders and medical/nursing
students). The majority of respondents (60.7%) had worked in the
hospital for 10 or fewer years.
Table S2 details the percent agreement with key attitudes and
belief statements. Of note is the fact that 88% of the respondents
considered a RDD event likely to be of severe health consequenc-
es, that only 41.9% felt they were knowledgeable about this threat,
that only 35.8% felt they were able to address public questions on
this threat, and only 31.9% were aware of their job-specific
responsibilities in such an event. The average ‘‘don’t know’’
response proportion was generally stable across strata (7–13%).
One single stratum, the lowest education level, had a higher
proportion of ‘‘don’t know’’ responses (16%),
Overall willingness to respond to a RDD scenario was 61% if
asked, and 72% if required. Table S1 shows that higher levels of
WTR if asked (‘‘unadjusted’’ for key demographic characteristics)
were associated with older age [OR(95%CI) of 1.56 (1.06, 2.77)
for ages 60+ as compared with ages ,30]; and for males compared
to females [OR(95%CI): 1.87 (1.53, 2.30)]. In addition, a
significantly lower unadjusted likelihood of WTR if asked was
evident for those having children and married [OR(95%CI): 0.69
(0.57, 0.83)] and single parents [OR(95%CI): 0.56 (0.41, 0.77)],
compared to those having no children regardless of marital status;
for those having pets [OR(95%CI): 0.79 (0.66, 0.95)] compared to
those without pets; and for nurses and ‘‘other’’ hospital workers
[OR(95%CI): 0.53 (0.38, 0.72) and 0.46 (0.36, 0.60), respectively]
compared to physicians. Other variables, including type of
department (emergency medicine, clinical and non-clinical) had
no significant association with WTR if asked. Except for the
association with age, children/marital status, elder family
members, and hours working, the other associations held similarly
for WTR if required.
In a multivariate analysis, four of the demographic and
professional factors (gender, age, marital status/dependent chil-
dren, and professional category) were found to be independently
associated with both WTR if asked and WTR if required, and are
used as adjustors in subsequent analyses.
After adjusting for these demographic factors, several attitude/
belief statements had a significant association with WTR if asked
(Table S2): perception that colleagues will report [OR(95%CI):
16.99 (13.06, 22.10)]; perceived high impact of one’s response
[OR(95%CI): 6.42 (5.14, 8.03)]; feeling psychologically prepared
to perform one’s role-specific responsibilities in the event
[OR(95%CI): 8.08 (6.41, 10.18)]; perceived confidence one would
be safe at work [OR(95%CI): 12.24 (9.21, 16.26)]; perceived
confidence one could safely get to work [OR(95%CI): 8.58 (6.76,
10.90)]; perceived ability to perform one’s duties [OR(95%CI):
9.27(7.35, 11.70)]; and perception that family is prepared to
function in one’s absence [OR(95%CI): 7.73 (6.18, 9.66)].
Associations of attitude/belief statements with the two WTR
contexts were also evaluated to consider staff who would respond
neither if asked nor if required (Table S3). Although significant
associations remain, they were generally smaller for WTR if
required and larger for WTR if asked than the associations in
Table S2 which considered a person’s response to each WTR
context individually.
When questioned about potential modifiers of willingness to
respond (conditional willingness to respond), WTR increased to
83.7% if daily preventive medications were made available
(compared to WTR of 61% if asked). Clarifications of potential
worker safety issues considerably reduced WTR rates, compared
to WTR if asked: if personal protective equipment was not
available for all staff (36.3%), and if a severe event was considered
(50.7%). Only 27.9% of the hospital employees with a perception
of low efficacy declared willingness to respond to a severe RDD
event. 51% of surveyed staff indicated they are unlikely to respond
to a RDD ‘‘regardless of its severity’’.
In accordance with the EPPM, measures for threat and efficacy
perception were calculated. When adjusting for the key demo-
graphic factors, higher perceived threat [OR(95%CI): 1.26 (1.03,
1.54)] and higher perceived efficacy [OR(95%CI): 6.89 (5.43,
8.75)] were associated with a higher WTR if asked (Table S2).
When the threat and efficacy factors were combined into the four
EPPM profiles, the High-Threat/High-Efficacy profile was
associated with at least seven times higher odds of WTR if
required and of WTR if asked, as compared to the odds for the
reference low-threat/low-efficacy profile [OR(95%CI): 7.12 (4.91,
10.32), and 7.16 (5.12, 10.00), respectively]. The threat compo-
nent of the profiles had no independent significant impact on
WTR if required, and the high-threat/low-efficacy profile had no
advantage over the low-threat/low-efficacy profile in either WTR
if asked or WTR if required. This similarly applies to the high-
efficacy comparison between threat levels.
Table 1 lists associations between self-reported willingness to
respond to a RDD emergency and respondents’ training and
disaster experiences. Only 50% of the respondents had received
some form of training, and less than 14% had undergone an RDD
drill. Those respondents that had no RDD training were almost
1.5 times more likely not to be willing to respond to duty even if
required, compared to those with at least some training.
Participants that had both disaster management training and
disaster experience were 6 times more likely to respond to a RDD
event, adjusted for the four key demographic factors associated
with WTR.
Discussion
Our study suggests that during a RDD or ‘‘dirty bomb’’ event, a
high proportion (39%) of the medical center staff may opt out from
Hospital Workers Response to Radiological Event
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willingness to work extra hours (associated with having dependent
family members and pets at home) are very strongly associated
with willingness to respond in such an emergency.
The use of a RDD or ‘‘dirty bomb’’ as a terrorist weapon is a
concern, as reflected by its inclusion among the U.S. National
Planning Scenarios. Psychological models suggest that risk
perception is an interplay between affective (risk as feeling) and
analytic (risk as analysis) processes [29]. According to these
models, peripheral factors independent of the actual risk have a
major effect on the perceived dread of an event. Factors that
render a perceived risk as more dreadful include events that are
involuntary, manmade, exotic, catastrophic, and with potential to
affect the next generation with little or no individual control.
Virtually each and every one of these risk perception modifiers is
present in a RDD scenario, rendering this event to be highly
dreadful to some, well beyond the actual (analytic) risks it bears.
During critical events, healthcare workers are expected to work
additional hours under significant stress, potentially at risk of
personal safety. When faced with the need to respond to duty
during a terrorist event, health professionals are subject to the
psychological impact of dread and outrage, caused by the
perception-modifying characteristics of a RDD event. This may
explain, at least in part, why such a large proportion of hospital
workers, almost 39%, report they would not be willing to report to
duty if asked during a RDD event. When further probed if they
would respond to a RDD event ‘‘regardless of severity’’, almost
half (51%) of surveyed staff indicated they are unlikely to do so.
This is a very high proportion when considering the first receiver
role of these personnel, ostensibly accustomed to responding to
emergencies and disasters.
These outcomes are in accordance with the limited but
expanding evidence-based literature on the perceptions of the
hospital-based workforce toward their emergency response duties
in a post-9/11 world. In two surveys performed in 2005 of NYC
healthcare workers (n=6,428), and hospital employees in 5 states
(n=1711), workers were far more willing to respond to natural
disasters than to a radiological event or an infectious disease
Table 1. Associations between self-reported willingness to respond (WTR) to a radiological dispersal device emergency and
respondents’ training and disaster experiences.
WTR if required WTR if asked but not required
Training/Disaster Experience %
a % Agree
b OR
c (95% CI)
d % Agree OR (95% CI)
Any training Some 50.6 75.5 Reference 64.5 Reference
None 49.4 69.1 0.69 (0.57–0.84) 58.2 0.74 (0.62–0.891)
Tabletop exercise(s) No 84.0 71.2 Reference 60.0 Reference
Yes 16.0 78.1 1.38 (1.03–1.82) 68.7 1.40 (1.09–1.81)
Full-scale drills(s)/exercise(s) No 85.9 71.3 Reference 60.3 Reference
Yes 14.1 78.7 1.53 (1.13–2.07) 68.0 1.36 (1.03–1.78)
Academic coursework No 85.5 71.0 Reference 59.3 Reference
Yes 14.5 79.8 1.46 (1.08–1.97) 73.0 1.66 (1.25–2.20)
Face-to-face training(s)/lecture(s)/presentation(s) No 80.0 70.5 Reference 59.2 Reference
Yes 20.0 79.6 1.63 (1.25–2.18) 70.0 1.58 (1.25–2.00)
Online training module(s) No 89.0 71.7 Reference 60.2 Reference
Yes 20.0 75.0 1.26 (0.98–1.61) 66.1 1.40 (1.11–1.77)
Writing emergency/disaster management (EM) plans No 91.9 71.5 Reference 60.2 Reference
Yes 8.1 81.7 1.96 (1.31–2.95) 74.3 2.11 (1.48–3.03)
Real-life disaster experience No 93.6 71.5 Reference 60.5 Reference
Yes 6.4 84.9 2.02 (1.24–3.27) 74.5 1.64 (1.09–2.46)
Disaster experience or training No 51.4 68.8 Reference 57.9 Reference
Yes 48.6 75.9 1.50 (1.23–1.83) 64.9 1.39 (1.16–1.68)
No training or disaster experience 51.4 68.8 Reference 57.9 Reference
Disaster experience only 1.4 80.0 1.72 (0.69–4.30) 69.0 1.41 (0.62–3.21)
Any training only 42.2 74.6 1.42 (1.12–1.74) 63.5 1.34 (1.10–1.62)
Any training and disaster experience 5.0 86.2 2.62 (1.48–4.62) 75.9 2.03 (1.27–3.25)
No EM training or disaster experience 87.2 71.0 Reference 59.7 Reference
Disaster experience only 4.7 81.4 1.65 (0.98–2.76) 69.0 1.31 (0.85–2.05)
EM training only 6.4 78.0 1.70 (1.11–2.61) 70.4 1.86 (1.26–2.74)
EM training and disaster experience 1.7 94.6 6.19 (1.43–26.79) 89.2 4.70 (1.63–13.58)
aPercent of respondents included in category.
bPercent agreeing with WTR statement (positive response).
cOR is the odds ratio provided in the logistic regression which compares the odds between a positive WTR response and a negative WTR response with respectt ot h e
type of training compared to its Reference category, adjusted for key demographic characteristics: gender, age, children/marital status, and type of professional
category.
d95%CI is the 95% confidence interval for the odds ratio.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0025327.t001
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RDD event are markedly worse than the 28% who were unwilling
to respond to a pandemic influenza event, measured in the same
setting and population (just prior to the 2009 H1N1 pandemic)
[27,28].
Having a workforce that is willing to respond is a critical
component of mitigating the effects of any disaster, and our study
results are a clear call for action. While work is being done by
disaster planners to improve ‘‘readiness’’ or ‘‘ability’’ to respond
during disasters, such as encouraging personal preparedness
planning, more needs to be done to address beliefs and attitudes
that may hinder ‘‘willingness’’ to respond. It is thus critically
important for us to understand why some healthcare workers are
unwilling to perform their duties during a radiological emergency
in order to implement changes in disaster training, education and
messaging.
Survey responses suggest that more attention is needed to
address healthcare workers’ basic knowledge level with regard to
radiation events. In fact, 58% of respondents disagreed with the
statement ‘‘I am knowledgeable about the potential medical
impacts of a dirty bomb emergency.’’ Two thirds of the staff
surveyed did not feel educated enough to address public questions,
and less than one third of the staff knew their role-specific
responsibilities. Indeed, in a recent study of 668 emergency nurses
in New York, the existing knowledge in regards to radiological
emergencies was determined to be poor [19]. In that study,
knowledge level and clinical ability had a positive association with
nurses’ level of willingness to respond to a radiological terrorism
event.
Quantitative results from our hospital-based study also echo a
qualitative study that assessed the views and perspectives of
emergency department clinicians in regard to radiologic terrorism
[30]. Researchers found through a series of ten focus groups that
study participants clearly and consistently felt that their facilities
were not adequately prepared for such an event, due to
inadequacy of response protocols, potential for staffing shortages,
and concerns about contamination and self-protection. When
considering the fear of potential staffing shortages indeed, in our
study, staff who felt that their peers are unlikely to respond to duty,
were 17 times more likely to refrain from reporting to duty
themselves in our study. This finding lends us a potentially
powerful tool to impact willingness to respond, by targeted
education campaigns to change subjective norms regarding
response to such an emergency.
One construct that was strongly and independently associated
with WTR was belief that the workplace will be safe. Perception of
personal safety was identified as a primary determinant of
willingness to respond in a radiological disaster in other previous
work as well [23]. This concern about personal protection is not
unique among responders to the potential scenario of radiological
terrorism events; in one study the question of ‘‘Will the hospital
protect me?’’ was the most important factor in determining the
workers willingness to respond [31]. First responders must be
educated as to the minimal risk of contamination from radiologic
materials in such an attack if universal precautions are used [32],
as well as in specific strategies of mitigating and minimizing
personal risk in such events. Thus, it is not surprising that
requiring the staff to report will not be enough to address the
worker shortage. Unwillingness of hospital staff to respond to a
RDD event remained as high as 27.6% if the workers were
required (and not just asked) to report to duty. Thus, even the
potential threat of loss of compensation or job is of limited
influence, as still over one of every four employees from a large
urban tertiary care hospital indicated they would not report for
work even if required – at a time they would be most needed in
their respective work roles.
Of all attitudes and beliefs, the attitude statements most strongly
associated with high WTR was willingness to work extra hours if
required. Those able and willing to work extra hours were 20
times more likely to be willing to respond during this event, after
controlling for demographic factors. These results may be
interpreted in view of the strong association identified between
lower ‘if asked’ WTR and having dependents at home – either
elderly (OR=0.81), children (OR=0.69) or even pets
(OR=0.79). Single parents with children had the lowest estimated
likelihood to respond to this event (OR=0.56). One reasonable
explanation may be that some of the hesitance to report to duty
among those unable to work long hours is associated with the need
to continuously take care of dependents during such an event.
Indeed, 88% of those unwilling to work extra hours had a family
member or a pet dependent solely on them.
Witte’s EPPM offers a framework for examining the interplay
and influence of perceptions of ‘‘threat’’ and ‘‘efficacy’’ on
adaptive or maladaptive behavior in the face of risk [26]. It has
shown its utility in previous work assessing WTR in pandemic
influenza and other catastrophic event scenarios [18,27,28]. Our
study is the first to analyze hospital employees’ perceived threat,
efficacy, and WTR during a RDD event through the lens of the
EPPM. This model potentially allows us to see how hospital
workers’ individual degrees of perceived threat (‘‘concern’’) and
perceived efficacy (‘‘confidence’’) influence their willingness to
respond to this type of event. In accordance with EPPM theory,
our survey results show that those who have a perception of high
threat and high efficacy – i.e., those who fit a ‘‘concerned and
confident’’ profile in the EPPM framework—had a high rate of
declared self-reported willingness to respond (if required) to a dirty
bomb event, which was about seven times [OR(95%CI): 7.16
(5.12–10)] higher than those fitting a ‘‘low threat/low efficacy’’
profile.
In contrast with the classic EPPM theory, perception of threat
had little impact on willingness to respond among hospital workers
in our study (Table S2). This could either imply that the
perception of threat in motivating response behavior in hospital
employees is not as important as the perception of one’s efficacy in
response, or that our threat assessment questions assessed the
‘analytic’ aspect of RDD risk perception, and could not assess the
‘affective’ effect of the additional dread associated with this event,
which is the effect that may impact WTR more significantly. One
other potential explanation is that the level of dread from such a
scenario is such that only minor variability exists between
individuals, in a level that bears little impact on decision making.
Our survey indicates that hospital employees are receptive to
more training in response to a radiation disaster. In fact, 87% of
respondents agreed that the hospital should provide pre-event
preparation and training for dirty bomb emergencies. Only 50%
of the respondents had received some form of training. Those who
had were almost 1.5 times more likely to be willing to respond to
duty even if not required than those with no training. Participants
that had both disaster management training and disaster
experience were 6 times more likely to respond to a RDD event,
adjusted for four demographic characteristics associated with
WTR. Most preparedness training for hospital workers presents
factual information on threats and response roles. Classroom and
web-based educational interventions are generally awareness-level
courses that focus on knowledge objectives, such as the nature of
disasters or terrorist events, medical effects, treatment modalities,
personal protective equipment, and immuno- or chemo-prophy-
laxis if available [33,34]. Some practicum courses have added skills
Hospital Workers Response to Radiological Event
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to mitigate such concerns include the application of internet-based
learning courses on aspects of radiation emergency management
and hazard mitigation [36], as well as conferences or medical
symposia to educate medical professionals on the aspects of patient
management in radiation injury scenarios [37], and extensive
preparatory planning [38].
Our study had several key limitations that must be considered
when interpreting its results. We have used an online survey, and
thus some members of hospital staff may have had unequal
opportunity to respond to it, despite the availability of computers
all around the hospital accessible to all employees. However, the
large number of respondents, representative of the entire hospital
staff, may point to its internal validity. This study was limited to
one institution, thus limiting its external validity. Despite this, the
study allows us to consider these results a high-level estimate for
other non-tertiary centers around the country. It is theoretically
possible that an individual could have responded more than once
to the survey, although the authors believe this is very unlikely
given the length of time required to fill out the survey. Finally,
there is always a concern about the difference between the
declared responses and actual conduct when facing the actual risk.
Again, one can assume that these results are thus conservative, and
actual willingness to respond may be lower but is unlikely to be
higher in a real-life event.
Conclusions
Our study demonstrates a significant gap that exists in hospital
preparedness for a ‘dirty bomb’ radiological terrorism event, with
nearly 40% of the workers unwilling to respond to duty during the
event. The subjective norm (perceived willingness of peers to
respond), personal safety issues, and perceived efficacy in one’s
role in response were found to be important parameters associated
with willingness to respond, while the level of perceived threat had
only minor impact. These data, in view of the considerable gaps in
perceived knowledge and training identified, lay the evidence
needed to guide future preparedness and curriculum planning for
hospital employees and to identify critical incentives for the
hospital workforce response during this type of disaster.
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